Corruption Time [v0.03]
i didnt lost much and i thought it was because of the checklist plugin which got disabled around that time. i got these red marks too. I am using a lot of plugins tho (including advanced tabled and markdown prettifier).
Corruption Time [v0.03]
When using the Kata Containers runtime, exiting an exec session stops the running container, and hangs the connected CLI if a TTY was opened. There is no mitigation at this time beyond avoiding execing into containers running on the Kata runtime.
The root cause of this issue is a long-standing bug in Moby. This will be resolved in a future release. Be advised that support for alternate OCI runtimes is a new feature and that similar issues may be discovered as more users start exercising this functionality.
It is also mildly suspicious if a contract was compiled with a version that wasnot the most recent at the time the contract was created. For contractscreated from other contracts, you have to follow the creation chainback to a transaction and use the date of that transaction as creation date.
See 0ed8d8da374 (doc hash-function-transition: pick SHA-256 asNewHash, 2018-08-04) and numerous mailing list threads at the time,particularly the one starting at @genre.crustytoothpaste.net/for more information.
A table of 4-byte CRC32 values of the packed object data, in theorder that the objects appear in the pack file. This is to allowcompressed data to be copied directly from pack to pack duringrepacking without undetected data corruption.
Step (1) takes the same amount of time as an ordinary object lookup:O(number of packs * log(objects per pack)). Step (2) takes O(number ofloose objects) time. To maintain good performance it will be necessaryto keep the number of loose objects low. See the "Loose objects andunreachable objects" section below for more details.
As an optimization, step 1 could write a file describing what non-blobobjects each object it has inflated from the packfile references. Thismakes the topological sort in step 2 possible without inflating theobjects in the packfile for a second time. The objects need to beinflated again in step 3, for a total of two inflations.
To avoid a proliferation of UNREACHABLE_GARBAGE packs, they can becombined under certain circumstances. If "gc.garbageTtl" is set togreater than one day, then packs created within a single calendar day,UTC, can be coalesced together. The resulting packfile would have anmtime before midnight on that day, so this makes the effective maximumttl the garbageTtl + 1 day. If "gc.garbageTtl" is less than one day,then we divide the calendar day into intervals one-third of that ttlin duration. Packs created within the same interval can be coalescedtogether. The resulting packfile would have an mtime before the end ofthe interval, so this makes the effective maximum ttl equal to thegarbageTtl * 4/3.
Not only would all developers and server operators supportingdevelopers have to switch on the same flag day, but supporting tooling(continuous integration, code review, bug trackers, etc) would have tobe adapted as well. This also makes it difficult to get early feedbackfrom some project participants testing before it is time for massadoption.
Some of the work of building the translation table could be deferred topush time, but that would significantly complicate and slow down pushes.Calculating the SHA-1 name at object creation time at the same time it isbeing streamed to disk and having its SHA-256 name calculated should bean acceptable cost.
Kosovo had a convulsive year in 2017. There were some improvements in electoral processes and civil society, while the fight against corruption stalled due to a lack of political will. Despite ever present semi-authoritarian temptations and the cooption of the administration by external interests, the existing constitutional and legal framework continued to provide safeguards against an outright concentration of power.
The elections showed that the rise of newcomer nationalist party Vetëvendosje and the erosion of traditional parties' power bases continued during 2017. Ideology has moved to the forefront of electoral campaigning, threatening the dominance of parties that originated in the 1990s and whose leadership, for the first time, is unclear. The newcomer party performed surprisingly well in both the parliamentary elections, where it became the largest group in the Assembly, and in the municipal elections, where it won three municipalities, including the two largest cities in Kosovo, Pristina, and Prizren. At the same time, PDK lost in half of the cities where it had previously controlled the city hall, and while its coalition came first in the general elections, the internal allocation of seats left it as the third parliamentary group. The Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), for its part, was able to win the highest number of municipalities in the municipal elections and remain the second largest parliamentary group despite only being the third most popular list.
Similarly, the fight against corruption stalled after the authorities showed an absolute lack of commitment to tackle high profile officials, preferring instead to focus on petty corruption and thus avoiding complicated processes and fighting against political connections.
The new Kosovar government will continue to struggle to implement its program. Internal contradictions, a weak coalition that is dependent on minority parties, and a unilateral approach will mark the following year, as the government will continue to sideline the Assembly to avoid due parliamentary control. The European Union (EU) will continue to request the fulfillment of several obligations inherited from the previous government, such as the ratification of the demarcation agreement with Montenegro, the establishment of the Association of Serb Municipalities, and the accomplishment of the final criteria for visa liberalization. This forceful approach might compensate for the weakness of the government, but its internal contradictions will continue to undermine its activities. At the same time, the opposition, especially Vetëvendosje, will struggle to overcome its own divisions, thus further deepening the governance crisis.
A lack of political will and the high politicization of state structures will continue to hamper the fight against corruption. The enhanced capacities of public authorities resulting from the latest reforms will collide with a lack of interest in pursuing high profile cases and addressing certain critical deficiencies, such as political party financing. In particular, political opposition to the Specialist Chambers will continue in 2018 despite diplomatic criticism.
Tensions remained high, especially in Serb areas, where the dominance of the Belgrade-backed Srpska Lista met resistance from local politicians. The most notable episode involved the leader of the Kosovo Serb Party (PKS), Aleksandar Jablanovic, who was involved in a number of clashes with Srpska Lista activists, among mutual accusations of violence and hate speech. A number of attacks took place within the Albanian political community, where the ongoing political realignment increased the competition between old and new parties; old parties additionally competed over a shrinking space as traditional strongholds became contested. In March, former politician and lawyer Azem Vllasi was shot and injured in Pristina. A man was swiftly arrested; he confessed to the crime, justifying his actions on Vllasi's political past. In October, Sadri Ramabaja, an outgoing Pristina Municipal Assembly member belonging to Vetëvendosje, was arrested while trying to cross into Albania and put in pretrial detention pending an investigation for planning a number of terrorist acts, including the attack on Vllasi. A few days after the attempted assassination of Vllasi, the mayor of Vushtrri/Vucitrn, Bajram Mulaku (PDK), was threatened with a gun in his own office. In this case, the security detail managed to prevent the would-be attacker from causing physical harm. That was not the case in May, when Arbana Xharra, a former investigative journalist, was attacked less than a week after joining PDK. Police were still investigating the case by year's end. Similarly, the wife of Blerand Stavilevci, at that time Minister of Economic Development (PDK), was attacked in August and required hospitalization. PDK blamed Vetëvendosje, even though a connection was never established, and urged the police to expedite the investigation.
Following the motion of no confidence against Prime Minister Isa Mustafa's government in May, President Thaçi called for elections to be held on June 11, thus leaving less than one month to organize the ballots. According to the legal framework, snap elections must be held within 30 to 45 days from the dissolution of the Assembly, and the president opted for the minimum threshold. This precipitateness created a number of difficulties along the entire process, due to shortened deadlines. In particular, the CEC was unable to process the vast number of vote-from-abroad requests, as conflicting timeframes in the law allowed unreasonably short deadlines. This phenomenon affected both Serbs currently residing in Serbia and Albanians elsewhere. In total, less than 15,000 people managed to register, from a diaspora population calculated to be around 800,000. Similarly, certification processes for the lists competing for seats reserved to minorities were problematic, as a number of non-Albanian parties attempted to present ethnic Albanians in their lists, which the CEC and the courts prevented. The constitution of Polling Station Committees (PSC) was also challenging, as these are supposed to be formed by representatives of the existing parties in the municipality. However, since many of these decided to run in preelection coalitions, the CEC was forced to improvise an ad hoc solution to ensure the due political representativeness of the PSC, within its legal powers. In the north, properly balancing competing Serb parties became even more difficult due to the lower degree of institutionalization in the region. 041b061a72